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Hans Jonas’ integrative philosophy of life 
as a foothold for integrative bioethics
ABSTRACT 
European approach to bioethical problems emphasizes, among others, a need for the widened 
and deepened consideration of the very notion of life, which should be taken in account 
when speaking about ethical dimensions of manipulation with the life at diff erent levels. Th is 
tendency could be traced in the works of Fritz Jahr, Albert Schweitzer, Georg Picht, Klaus Mi-
chael Meyer-Abich and especially Hans Jonas (1903–1993). In that sense, we should take into 
consideration not only Jonas’ ethics of responsibility, developed in the late phase of his life, but 
also his long-term research of Gnostic religion and thought, as well as his attempt to establish the 
philosophical biology as a new philosophy of the human, nature and life. Jonas developed the 
integrative philosophy of life in which centre stands ethically connotated philosophy of nature, 
based both on the results of contemporary natural sciences and theological speculations. It 
shows us clearly what pluriperspectivity and integrativity in bioethics actually mean, because 
it is far from any reductionism and tries to include diff erent scientifi c and non-scientifi c per-
spectives, off ering at the same time a platform for their dialogical mediation.
Key words: Hans Jonas, integrative bioethics, life, nature, human, responsibility, philosophy, 
ethics, biology, theology
European bioethics and integrative bioethics
If we extract some basic features from "European bioethics" and "integrative bioeth-
ics", in order to consider what they are and what they ought to be, we could realize 
that these two concepts could be used almost synonymously. Namely, one of the 
basic features of European bioethics is that it is in a permanent dialogical relation-
ship with or even rooted in philosophy, i.e. European philosophical tradition. In 
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other words, if we try to distinguish European bioethics from "mainstream bioeth-
ics" as an Anglo-American "product", it would be easiest to do this by following the 
line of productive interlacement of bioethical refl ection with philosophy. Th ere are 
two tasks that arise from this fact. Th e fi rst of them could be called the philosophiza-
tion of bioethics. It does not mean that philosophy has "appropriated" bioethics, that 
bioethics is now to be treated as a mere sub-discipline of philosophical ethics, which 
would benefi t neither philosophy nor bioethics. "Philosophization of bioethics" re-
fers to the activation of the potentials of the Euro-continental ethical or philosophi-
cal thought within the bioethical framework, for bioethics to be able to fulfi l its 
original ("Potterian", according to Van Rensselaer Potter, "the father of bioethics") 
mission that cannot be achieved exclusively with the help of an approach that rests 
on a reduced understanding of bioethics either in terms of its problems and topics 
or in terms of its methodology. Th e second task could be called the bioethicization of 
philosophy. Th is means bioethically reading the leading authors and works of the 
Euro-continental philosophical tradition for the purpose of identifying both the 
footholds of establishing and developing dialogue between bioethics and philoso-
phy, and the incentives to refl ect on bioethical problems in partnership. Both tasks 
imply the demand for Europeanization of bioethics, as well as the wider concept of bio-
ethics which we call integrative bioethics. Integrative bioethics could be defi ned as an 
interdisciplinary and pluriperspective consideration of moral dilemmas arising from 
the new techno-scientifi c possibilities of manipulation with life: human and non-
human life, living beings and life conditions; in other words, life as a whole and 
each of its parts, life in all its forms, shapes, degrees, stages and manifestations.1
For this purpose, integrative bioethics emphasizes a need for the widened and deep-
ened consideration of the very notion of life, which should be taken in account 
when speaking about ethical dimensions of manipulation with the life at diff erent 
levels. Th e same demand and approach – which was developed before or parallel to 
the "offi  cial emergence" of bioethics in 1960s and 1970s – could be traced in the 
works of "founding fathers" of European bioethics such as Fritz Jahr and Albert 
Schweitzer, as well as in the works of very important European authors such as 
Georg Picht, Klaus Michael Meyer-Abich, and especially German-American philos-
opher Hans Jonas (1903–1993). 
Before focusing on the main topic of this article – Hans Jonas’ philosophy of life – I 
will say few words on the very notion of life, i.e. diff erent approaches to it. 
1 For more detailed consideration of the topic presented in the fi rst paragraph see Hrvoje Jurić, "Stützpunkte 
für eine integrative Bioethik im Werk Van Renssealer Potters", in: Ante Čović and Th omas Sören Hoff mann (eds.), 
Integrative Bioethik / Integrative Bioethics, Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin 2005, pp. 68-92.
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Notion of life and diff erent approaches to it
What do we think when we say "life"? Do we all think the same? Hardly. Th erefore, 
one of the main tasks of bioethics is to re-think itself and its fundamental notion. 
Th e notion of life should not be used undiff erentiatedly, especially in ethical discus-
sions. 
Hans Werner Ingensiep, in his article "Was ist Leben?" (What Is Life?), states the 
following:
"It is a fact that ambiguous and diverse notions of life are in use, be it on the purely 
descriptive or the evaluative level (…). Th ere are divided discourses on life within 
these discussion areas. Meanings are often ripped out from context and transferred 
from one area to another, almost drowned between diff erent metaphors, so that the 
philosophers (…) hold, with good reason, that the notion of life is ‘unclear’. But in 
general we can live with that. Only within the bioethics we are dealing with a par-
ticular problem situation, if, for example, the terms ‘life’ and ‘person’ should be dis-
tinguished. However, the ‘persons’ also are living beings. Not only because of that, 
the biological notion of life must be connectable to bioethics. As the examples make 
clear, the question ‘What is life?’, which was posed more theoretically up to now, is 
highly controversial. Although we are dealing with diff erent issues of life, we need 
the notion of life as a bridge between the separate discussion fi elds, as well as its in-
tegration and communication power, especially if there should be a continuous and 
constructive dialogue about the ‘life’ between scientists from natural sciences and 
humanities."2
Th e complexity of life, as well as complexity of dilemmas connected to it, requires 
therefore an equally complex approach. Discourse on life demands both inclusion 
of diff erent approaches and dialogical mediation between them, because neither the 
multidimensionality nor the entirety of life can be embraced from the reductionist 
point of view. 
Th ere are three main traditional approaches to the phenomenon of life and the con-
cept of life: natural-scientifi c approach, philosophical approach, and theological ap-
proach. Each of those approaches could be considered as reductionist if it is exclu-
sive or practiced without taking other approaches into consideration. 
Natural-scientifi c approach relies primarily on a biochemical understanding of life, 
understanding of life as a chemical and physiological structure or process, so that 
the natural-scientifi c defi nition of life off ers only the list of separate characteristics 
2 Hans Werner Ingensiep, "Was ist Leben? – Grundfragen der Biophilosophie", in: Jahrbuch Ökologie 2002, 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, Berlin 2002, pp. 92-93.
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that diff ers living beings and systems from the non-living ones (e.g. organization, 
metabolism, growth, irritability, adaptation, reproduction, etc.). Due to these fea-
tures, this approach could also be called a materialistic and mechanistic and it could 
be regarded as a reductionist, because it captures only what can be explored by the 
methods and apparatus of natural sciences, and expressed in terms of natural sci-
ences. In other words, it captures only what fi ts in predetermined scientifi c and 
methodological framework of natural sciences, and thus can be objectifi ed, explored 
and expressed exactly.
Th e second approach is the philosophical approach. I am not referring to various 
forms of "natural philosophy" or the philosophical trends such as vitalism or 
Diltheyian philosophy of life, but the approach which is dominant in modern phi-
losophy and has subjectivist and existentialist features. It is also, in a sense, reduc-
tionist. Namely, such a philosophy deals with anthropo-logic of life, plunges into 
the depths of the human and insists on the specifi cities resulting from the rational 
structure of the human subject, and thus in a greater or lesser extent ignores human 
rootedness in the world of the living.
Th e third is the theological approach. Th e main features of this conception of life can 
be read out from the concept of "sanctity of life", whose primary horizon is the reli-
gious worldview and diff erent theological conceptions. Life is a creation of divine 
instance, the godlike creation and refl ection of god’s existence, so that it implies the 
dignity of life, which, of course, primarily concerns human life. Th erefore we can 
say that the biocentrism specifi c to the doctrine of the "sanctity of life" – witnessed 
by the religious myths and legends, as well as theological speculations – is on the 
one hand based on postulates of theocentrism, while it is on the other hand anthro-
pocentrically founded. In this case we can also speak about a kind of reductionism, 
since the theological approach also abstracts from non-human life and the natural 
facts related to human existence.3 
Anyway, a kind of reconciliation of these three approaches, or transcending their 
mutual confrontations and imperfections, we could fi nd in the philosophy of Hans 
Jonas, which tried to embrace wide spectrum of topics relevant for the discussion on 
the notion of life, as well as bio-ethical problems. 
3 Of course, the above made division and defi nitions are, like every other division and defi nition, imperfect. 
Namely, there are also many examples of "refl exive natural science", "holistic philosophy" or "biophilic theology".
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Hans Jonas’ philosophy of life
When talking about Jonas’ contribution to bioethical discussions and the very foun-
dation of bioethics, it is expected to take into consideration primarily his ethics of 
responsibility, developed in the late phase of his life and formulated in the philo-
sophical bestseller Das Prinzip Verantwortung (or, in English translation, Th e Impera-
tive of Responsibility),4 whose intention was to develop an "ethics for the technologi-
cal age". Nevertheless, Jonas’ contribution to bioethics should be explored in other 
phases of his work, as well. In his long-term research of late-ancient and early-Chris-
tian Gnostic religion and thought we can fi nd the very roots of world-views that have 
marked our Western tradition, including Western concepts of life and relationship 
to it.5 But it seems that, in the context of bioethical discussion, the most important 
part of his philosophy is his attempt to establish the philosophical biology as a new 
philosophy of the human, nature and life. In his work Th e Phenomenon of Life (or, 
in German translation, Organismus und Freiheit),6 Jonas tried to establish and de-
velop "philosophical biology" as an integrative philosophy of life in whose centre 
stands ethically connotated philosophy of nature, based both on the results of con-
temporary natural sciences and theological speculations. 
Jonas’ intention was to establish the philosophical biology as an "’existential’ reading 
of biological facts", or as "a new reading of biological record",7 i.e. a new philosophi-
cal reading of biological record. Its main scope is to abolish the "artifi cial split be-
tween spheres of the external and the internal, body and mind, the nature and the 
human".8 Th is kind of dualism seems to be unsustainable, fi rst and foremost, in the 
case of organism. Organism "is the whole not only in the sense of functioning (…), 
but also in the sense of body-mind unity", which means that "the inner aspect or 
the subjectivity of organism is inevitable for the biological understanding as equally 
4 Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt a/M 1979; Hans Jonas, Th e Imperative of Responsibility. In Search of Ethics for the Technological Age, Th e 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1984. Here I am referring to the latter.
5 See for example: Hans Jonas, Gnosis und spätantiker Geist, Part 1: Die mythologische Gnosis, Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, Göttingen 1934, Part 2: Von der Mythologie zur mystischen Philosophie, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
Göttingen 1954; Hans Jonas, "Gnosis, Existenzialismus und Nihilismus", in: Hans Jonas, Zwischen Nichts und 
Ewigkeit. Drei Aufsätze zur Lehre vom Menschen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1987, pp. 5-25; Hans Jonas, 
Th e Gnostic Religion. Th e Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity, Beacon Press, Boston 1958.
6 Hans Jonas, Th e Phenomenon of Life. Toward a Philosophical Biology, Harper & Row, New York 1966; Hans 
Jonas, Organismus und Freiheit. Ansätze zu einer philosophischen Biologie, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 
1973. Here I am referring to later English edition: Hans Jonas, Th e Phenomenon of Life. Toward a Philosophical 
Biology, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 2001.
7 H. Jonas, Th e Phenomenon of Life, p. xxiii.
8 Hans Jonas, Erkenntnis und Verantwortung. Gespräch mit Ingo Hermann in der Reihe "Zeugen des Jahrhunderts", 
Lamuv, Göttingen 1991, p. 105.
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as the objectivity of organism".9 His anti-dualistic enterprise has been made in order 
"to break through the anthropocentric confi nes of idealist and existentialist philoso-
phy as well as through materialist confi nes of natural science".10 Of course, Jonas 
promotes, at the same time, the dialogue between natural sciences and humanities, 
which are today complementary to each other, because none of them can comprise 
the phenomenon of life in its entirety. 
Th erefore, a new philosophy of life should embrace in its subject-fi eld both "philos-
ophy of the organism" and "philosophy of mind". According to Jonas, philosophy 
of the organism starts with the thesis that "the organic even in its lowest forms pre-
fi gures mind", while on the other hand, philosophy of mind starts with the thesis 
that "mind even on its highest reaches remains part of the organic".11 
Jonas thinks that everything we fi nd in human has its "rudimentary traces in even 
the most primitive forms of life".12 Key concept of Jonas’ teleological philosophy of 
nature is the concept of freedom. Since the mind is, from the beginning, prefi gured 
in the organic, this is also the case with the freedom. Freedom exists already at the 
basic level of organic existence, i.e. in the primal metabolism. Moreover, as Jonas 
says, metabolism itself is the "fi rst form of freedom", which means that the principle 
of freedom can be found already in the "dark stirrings of primeval organic 
substance".13 
Th e other key concept of Jonas’ philosophy of life is mediacy in the relation of or-
ganism to environment, i.e. the distance between living being and its environment. 
It describes the progressive scale of the organic on whose peak stands the human. In 
addition to the principle of metabolism and the more advanced aspects of mediacy 
in the relation of living being to environment, in humans there is a wide range of 
specifi c human characteristics, in short: the mind. However, this does not imply 
that the human should be observed in the "metaphysical isolation" from the rest of 
the living world.
Jonas clearly indicates the ethical implications of his doctrine of life. In that sense, 
the aim of his philosophy of life is the affi  rmation of inherent self-purpose and value of 
being, life and all living beings. It is the task which asks for foundation of an explic-
itly non-anthropocentric ethics. Such an ethical conception has been presented in 
Jonas’ ethics of responsibility, but it has been announced already in his philosophi-
9 Ibid., p. 105-106.
10 H. Jonas, Th e Phenomenon of Life, p. xxiii.
11 Ibid., p. 1.
12 Ibid., p. xxiii.
13 See ibid., p. 3.
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cal biology. It implies the following: all living beings and the nature, too, are not 
only the objects of our moral duties, which means that they deserve moral consid-
eration not only on the basis of "human mercifulness". Our ethical "Ought" arises 
from the ontological "Is" of the living beings. Th e nature and the life establish the 
purposes and the values by themselves. Our moral duty is to recognize and to re-
spect those purposes and values. Th e ethical formulation of it is – the imperative of 
responsibility. Whatever (or whoever) is exposed to our power should be embraced by 
our responsibility, because it is entrusted to us. It is the "ontological responsibility". 
Th e life itself delivers the purposes and values, which should be only recognized and 
respected by the human, because the human is "the executor of a trust which only 
he can see, but did not create".14
Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn briefl y presents what the "ontological foundation of eth-
ics" and "ontological ethics" actually means. Th ere is the threefold connection be-
tween the being and responsibility: ability for responsibility as a characteristics of hu-
man way of being; being of the human as an object of responsibility; the whole of 
the being as an instance of responsibility, as well as an instance which makes the re-
sponsibility inevitable.15 
Th e newly gained insight into the vulnerability of nature results with the new ethi-
cal demand. Jonas speaks about the "right of the nature", which is far more than 
anthropocentric and utilitarian interest of the human and humankind.16 Unlike in 
earlier epochs of humankind, we discover today that the nature is totally exposed to 
our (techno-scientifi c) power. Th erefore, we should act according to this insight, i.e. 
we should respect nature’s right to be sustained in this state and promote the duty to 
ensure a future, which both also imply the future existence of the human and hu-
mankind. Jonas’ categorical imperative – "Act so that the eff ects of your action are 
compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"17 – is not an anthropocen-
tric one. However, "no previous ethics", says Jonas, "has prepared us for such a role 
of stewardship".18 Th at is the reason why we need a new ethics, which would be 
based on the principle of responsibility. Neither traditional scientifi c worldview nor 
traditional ethics can tell us what we should do in order to protect the nature as a 
basis of human existence, as well as future existence of life in general. Moreover, 
14 Ibid., p. 283.
15 See Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn, "Verantwortungsbegriff  und kategorischer Imperativ der Zukunftsethik von 
Hans Jonas", in: Wolfgang Erich Müller (ed.), Hans Jonas – von der Gnosisforschung zur Verantwortungsethik, 
Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2003, pp. 109-110. 
16 See H. Jonas, Th e Imperative of Responsibility, p. 8.
17 Ibid., p. 11.
18 Ibid., p. 8.
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both traditional and current scientifi c worldview, which made the ethics extremely 
anthropocentric and short-sighted, "emphatically denies us all conceptual means to 
think of Nature as something to be honored".19 Jonas says, consequently, that "we 
should keep ourselves open to the thought that natural science may not tell the 
whole story about Nature".20 We can fi nd the similar statement in Th e Notion of 
Nature and Its History (Der Begriff  der Natur und seine Geschichte) by Georg Picht: 
"Th e modern natural science destroys the nature",21 so that "the science which de-
stroys the nature cannot be the true knowledge on nature".22
Besides the above sketched biological-scientifi c and ethical-philosophical way of 
thinking about the life, there is the third perspective which should be taken into ac-
count – the metaphysical and theological one. 
Th e question of life is not only the question about the development of life, about its 
evolution. It is also the question about its beginning, which comprises both its bio-
logical evolution and successive ontological revolutions. However, there is also a 
question about the "fi rst cause", which could be helpful while answering questions 
on purpose and meaning of the great cosmic adventure of life. 
Trying to come to the "fi rst cause", as well as to the "fi nal answers" in this fi eld, Jo-
nas included into his philosophy of life the "metaphysical speculations", too, which 
are certainly inspired by his earlier studies of Gnosticism. Sometimes he did it by 
using strictly philosophical categories, sometimes he used theological concepts, but 
sometimes he dared to propose his own cosmogony or even theogony. Jonas ex-
plains his "metaphysical speculations" as "an ontological revisioning, fulfi lling the 
concept of ‘matter’", i.e. "a meta-physics of the world-substance".23 
On the other hand, we cannot say that Jonas was the "creationist", although his 
theory is close to Judeo-Christian creationism, neither can we say that he was "evo-
lutionist", although his theory is close to the Darwinist evolutionism. His philoso-
phy of life presupposes the spontaneity of life and nature, but he does not deny the 
concept of "mind in nature" or the "prime mover". However, it should be noted 
that this weakens both the metaphysical-dogmatic images of "divine plan" and 
"god-mathematician", and the concept of "pointless and meaningless evolution". 
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Georg Picht, Der Begriff  der Natur und seine Geschichte, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1993, p. 12.
22 Ibid., p. 15.
23 Hans Jonas, Materie, Geist und Schöpfung. Kosmologischer Befund und kosmogonische Vermutung, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt a/M 1988, p. 20.
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Anyhow, there are strong ethical demands arising from this viewpoint, and Jonas 
develops them following the logic of responsibility.
Conclusion
In brief, Jonas’ "philosophical biology" could be explained as an attempt of both 
"biologization of philosophy" and "philosophization of biology", including "ethici-
zation of the question of life". In its center stands the ethically connotated philoso-
phy of human, nature and life, which respects the results of natural sciences, but 
also opens the door to the metaphysical speculations, that means theological or even 
mythological speculations. 
If we follow Jonas, we could show how the synergy of evolutionist-biological, teleo-
logical-philosophical and religious-theological approach contributes to answering 
the question of life. Only such an integratively structured notion of life can be the 
starting point of integrative ethics of life, or integrative bioethics, which implies re-
spect and responsibility for the nature and life in general. Only such an integrative 
philosophy and ethics of life can show us what pluriperspectivity and integrativity 
in bioethics actually mean, because it is far from any reductionism and tries to in-
clude diff erent scientifi c and non-scientifi c perspectives, off ering at the same time a 
platform for their dialogical mediation. 
By emphasizing philosophical approach to the phenomenon of life, I did not want 
to devaluate other approaches. Th e point is that the philosophical approach to the 
life – which we can fi nd in Jonas’ works – is characterized by exceptional integrativ-
ity. On the one hand, it activates all the potentials of philosophy (from metaphysics, 
ontology and anthropology, over ethics, to cultural and political philosophy), while 
on the other hand, it transcends the boundaries of philosophy as a discipline, be-
cause it enables (or even demands) broadening of the perspective on the natural sci-
ences and theology. Philosophy – as a model of integrative thought – presupposes 
an attempt to embrace and dialogically intermediate empirical-scientifi c, rational-
speculative and psychological-emotional dimensions of the approach to the world 
and life. Th is means that philosophy and, especially, philosophical ethics – fi rst and 
foremost owing to their inherent integrative features – do play a major role in inte-
grative bioethics, which is not in disagreement with the methodological principle of 
interdisciplinarity and pluriperspectivism. Anyway, neither philosophy nor any oth-
er science, neither religious nor non-religious approaches – if they are isolated from 
other approaches – can have the monopoly on the truth of life. Th e only ban which 
is implied by the pluriperspective approach is the ban of monoperspectivism. 
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"Th e phenomenon of life itself negates the boundaries that customarily divide our 
disciplines and fi elds",24 says Hans Jonas. It is up to us to respect or disrespect this 
fact. But we should keep in mind that monoperspectivism makes us short-sighted 
or even blind, while pluriperspectivism enables us to look at the phenomenon of life 
both through microscope and telescope, as well as with our inner theoretical eye, in 
order to approach an integrative understanding of and knowledge on life, as well as 
an integrative ethics of life.
24 H. Jonas, Th e Phenomenon of Life, p. xxiv.
